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M ANND MEDICInE.1 By Henry E. Sigerist New York: W. W. Norton
and Co., Inc. 1932. pp. x, 340.
LAw in these latter days has gone to school to medicine. Law learned in the
going. It learned-i.e., it mastered what a kindergarten child should know--
in professional education. For instance, that there is a difference between a
trade school and a university; indeed, that "University School of Law" is not
by law of nature a contradiction in terms. Law also began a Montessori course
in distinguishing the art of law from an objective science of the subject, and in
groping toward development of the embryonic science. Law began to squirm
loose from traditional bonds of utter self-sufciency, to doubt whether it of
itself provided criteria for the world and for itself, to enrich its thought and
techniques by study of the neighboring disciplines. All this, to which medicine
gave perhaps the major stimulus, was very cheering, cheering equally to lawyers
and to others. It began to appear that lawyers seemed stupid, back-ard, blind,
only in the way in which savages appear so to the civilized: not because their
native intelligence was low-indeed, they displayed amazing craft in their own
peculiar pursuits, and the uncanny patience of a Zulu on the hunt-but only be-
cause they had not had advantages, only because the cultural background of their
tribe was undeveloped. This was indeed cheering, and going to school began
to be fun. Sigerist's book is a new lesson, in many ways more stirring even
than the old.
It is written with sense of style and pace. It accomplishes a thing remarkable
and fine: to see a picture whole, to make the reader see it whole, to introduce
3iew men to new matter without confusion, without distortion. The book lives.
Medicine and medics become alive in it-as a going whole that is a part of a
greater whole: society. The story opens in fortunate alignment with the
medical curriculum, from structure (anatomy) of the people whom the medic
serves through function (physiology) and the intangibles (psychology, con-
stitution) to present the case of the sick as persons in some manner out of
gear, the problem of healing as a problem of bringing them into working gear
again, the ideology of "disease" as a mere ordering of experience for iwo in
healing some specific person.
Two things stand out in the treatment. The first, a wide-ranging and fas-
cinating fund of knowledge on medical practice, medical theory, medical school-
ing, and the functioning of the healer and his art in communities ancient and
modern-peculiarly in the Mediterranean and European cultures. Sigerist's
knowledge on these-things is not only gathered; it is gripped, and it lives.
Against them are set modern problems, against them modern conditions wheel
into light and line. Medicine as an art, medicine as a science, take shape
before us: a struggle of man against man's ills, unceasing, untiring, magnificent
Medicine as art and science plays into the turbid or flashing currents of
surrounding culture, part of a something greater, dulling or dulled, stirred
1. This review is based on the German edition, Einffihrung in die Medezin,




itself or stirring. Medicine becomes not only craft and ordered understanding,
but a quest and an humanity; the physician, the inheritor of priesthood, of
magic lore, of Greek sublety of sight and speculation, of Fifteenth Century
burning curiosity-the physician emerges a human being in a human world,
charged with the noblest'of its traditions: understanding, that he may help.
As the study of individual constitution and the newer movements in psychology
drive on toward an understanding of wholeness that both synthesizes and con-
ditions the functioning of parts, so Sigerist is seeking a wholeness of medicine
in an age of specialists, a wholeness of person in a day when massed learning
threatens to submerge the physician in externalized technique. The job needs
doing. It is amazingly well done.
What have we of this nature in the law? In English, nothing. Zane's The
Story of Law is puerile, scattered, with insight into nothing, and devoid of
any sense of history as a process. Good history we do have, in decent measure,
but how much which brings that history, save within this ten-acre lot or that,
into a functioning relationship with law or lawyer-men today? Pound's Inter-
pretations of Legal History is an illuminating survey of changes in prevailing
interest, philosophy, exploration, in the light of faith and needs 2-but in
the general the individual law man disappears. For discussion of the profession
of today, for study of what a lawyer means to his community and to himself,
we are driven to scattered essays, or to biography. Law as a humanity is a hope
-realized by Maitland, realized by Holmes-stirring this decade past a score of
pens, even some scattered lives; but still, in its synthesis, to be accomplished. We
cannot hand our students such a book as Sigerist's. The nearest to it that I know
is Hedemann's Einfiihrung in die Rechtswissenschaft-a rich work, on a broad
and well-planned frame. But there the history is neither so culture-integrated
as Sigerist's, nor is its humanity so clear, nor yet its style compelling. And,
being of the law, and so conditioned nationally, it cannot serve our students.
Particular phases of Sigerist's presentation are directly fertile for the lawyer.
So his steady pressure on the fact that only the abandonment of the demand for
a unified "system" of medicine, only the willingness to keep scientific synthesis
at any given time inside the bounds of the objectively verifiable data of the day
-in patient recognition that unesthetic gaps must leer in the result-could lay
the foundation of scientific advance in medicine. Such self-restraint is no less
necessary in the law. Our discipline, like his, must mark off its science from its
philosophy, and both from its art, if its scientific side is to gain ground and yield
fruit for the art and the philosophy. So again the point already mentioned, of
dealing with particular "diseases" as convenient abstractions which make ob-
servations manageable, which do not control but summarize the behavior con-
cerned, which have utility to the extent that sequence, concomitance, regularity
in events may be discovered. 3 Legal concepts do not differ from medical, in this
2. Pound's approach is a specific test of the value of Pareto's beautiful
theory of the sociology of Theories. 1 TRAIT DE SocIoLomI GLNtALn (1917)
6, ff.
3. Sigerist is not consistent in his approach to this. The reference here is
to the prevailing attitude he takes. It bears the marks of being too recent
and troubling to his thinking to have been fully digested at the time of writing,
so that from time to time "diseases" also appear as definite, active entities.
For examples of the inconsistency contrast pp. 124 and 135 (view here given)
with 133 (the entity); the two approaches are found in proper harmony on
p. 143; and in hopeless confusion at pp. 178-179; as also at p. 197. I go joy-
ously along with Sigerist's assumption that no great metaphysical foundation
needs to be laid (explicitly or in silence) for such a culture synthesis as his;
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aspect, on the observational side. Neither do they differ so very materially
on the normative side; for out of observational concepts and propositions grow
normative rules of practical medicine as to what the doctor ought to do in
particular cases, which rules are mixed of certainty and uncertainty precisely
as are the legal rules addressed to judges. So far as judges work changes,
whether in the rules or in the set-up of society, and so far as they in any
writer's opinion ought to do so, the rule to the judge serves an additional
purpose which the rule to the physician does not: for it may in that aspect
have value beyond the value derived from accurate summation of the past.
But the individual constitution of the patient produces the same sort of modi-
fying and often subconscious hunch in the healer which the individual set-up
of fact and background excites in the judge. In both cases the problem is to
get clear a thing we have not yet got clear: how vauch the rule governs the
behavior of him to whom it is addressed, and how its effects on behavior occur,
and when and how and how strongly deflecting factors enter. Reading about
these things as applied to strange material stimulates a lawman much as does
the study of comparative law: the juxtaposition of similarity and contrast
makes the eye see.
No less instructive is the hapless fate of the search to find "the" nature of
"disease.' One is minded of the search to find "the" nature of "law." In both
eases we seem to have a fairly heterogeneous mass of human conduct lumped
under a single label. In both, we seem to make headway only by giving up the
language-ridden notion that there vmust be some happy unity in any things
which happen by tradition to wear a single verbal uniform.
Finally, there grows from the reading an insistent excitement as one watches
the rise of one science after another, preparing new medical advance and being
turned to serve it. An insistent excitement, for one who knows of law turning
its back upon the social disciplines through the long years, who sees it now
reaching out into them for new suggestion. A lesson, too, of patience. Time
and again medicine went forth to seek the panacea among her neighbors. Each
time, misled and cheated by herself, she came back in despair. Each time,
when the dreaming after all-at-once had faded, with some new tool.
Perhaps most interesting for the lawyer is Sigerist's last chapter: the medical
profession in the modern state; admission to and regulation of medical practice;
control, self-government and competition; provision of livelihood for medics
and of medical service for the whole community. Most interesting, partly,
because here we see our work affecting the doctor's; but most interesting,
chiefly, because our profession is as to its service to the community, in the
throes of a longdrawn crisis. Again, medicine has forged ahead of us: the
clinic, the Krankenkasse, the public health service. Matters are indeed far
from well with medicine in this regard. It is, for one instance, a medical racket
which is giving concern in New York workmen's compensation. And the survey
on the cost of medical care gives cause to ponder. But an audit of the work of
the legal fraternity in metropolitan centers, as to how many needs it serves,
and w lose, and how, would make the picture in medicine look like a summer
moon-lovely, and richly bright-and very far away.
One congratulates Dr. Sigerist on his book.4 One congratulates the brother
profession. One envies both. They will not chide us if we stir a dash of
but an author must strive to get his own approach clear enough to avoid cross-
purposing his own effects. Compare the confusion in reasoning on condition
and cause on p. 220.
4. One also is forced to quarrel with him on occasion. It is. not fair to
ask any man to be always at his best, but he must not be permitted unchallenged
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bitter pride into our envy: it was from among us that the first full view of
history came. If we have fallen behind, our discipline can claim at least to
have given the impetus which made possible a book like Man and Medicine. It
seems, however, that we are now in need of a receiver; it seems we have been
sliding into insolvency and adventures of dubious yield, while the finest assets
in our own tradition lie unused.
Columbia University School of Law. K. N. LLmvEYN.
to fall below the standard he can and does maintain in general. Neither should
one quarrel because an author displays the defects of his qualities. Sigerlst
is attempting a huge synthesis in the compass of 400 pages; he must therefore
work at times with techniques and materials with which he is only partly
familiar; he must shorten and simplify at times beyond possibility of accuracy.
The net effect is to be true; spots of raw color, misleading in themselves, are to
merge into a whole. But this requires not only Sigerist's brilliance of insight
and his power to relate farflung facts, not only his artistry in writing; it
requires also relentless self-criticism, a weeding out of seeming insights from
sound ones. In the main Sigerist's touch here is very sure. Not always.
One is bothered sometimes at over-facile manipulation of seemingly un-
familiar tools. A statistician would not, e.g., have suggested that the move-
ment of population could be "judged" from birth and death rates (p. 209)
without the reader's feeling in the background a due consideration of immi-
gration and emigration, age-distribution, and such differentials as were obtain-
able by class, vocation, and the like.
Occasionally enthusiasm leads to bad reporting. Thus on p. 119 appears
verbatim a sweetly careful Hippocratic description of an epidemic of the
swellings that we know as mumps. "They occurred among boys, young men,
adult men; in greatest number among those who were assiduous at the wrestling-
places and the gymnastic exercizes. Only a few women were affected," To
this the author (p. 120): "He sees that the women, who sit at home, wore
affected less often, but that the boys and men suffered more frequently,
particularly those who were constantly visiting places at which folk congregated
in some numbers" (my italics). Now the Hippocratic text does not show this
at all. It is suggested into the text by a modern familiar with contagion. The
careful ancient may just as well have been wondering whether severe physical
exercise was not the criterion; or even sex. And Sigerist tells us on p. 137
that Greek medicine never reached a clear concept of contagion and on p. 191
that the nature of epidemics was wholly dark to them. This ought to worry
the reader with fear that evidence not so fully presented has been similarly
distorted in interpretation. But in the main it does not. The feel of the
reporting is, almost throughout, solid. So is the feel of the interpretation.
The instance is definitely a single slip. It is as definitely an indication of a
danger.
Much more troubling are the occasions where the drive for relating the hitherto
unrelated kicks free of its habitual balance. There is a horrible passage on p.
214 purporting to relate the dominant disease-types of an epoch with "the
forces which form its style." There is just enough undigested truth in this
to make it vicious; it threatens to discredit the beauties of the book. Then
there are the places where insights sound in core have not up to the time of
writing been worked out by the author, and show the fact by the awkward
implications of language chosen in confusion. (p. 144: certain conceptual forms
"impossible" in certain cultures-again those half-thought-through style-forming
forces; p. 358: specialization inevitable at a certain "age" of any culture; and
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CASES AND READINGS ON PROPERTY. By Everett Fraser. Volume L
Chicago: Commerce Clearing House. 1932. pp. xii, 511.
CASES ON CONVEYANCES. By Marion Rice Kirkwood. Chicago: Com-
merce Clearing House. 1932. pp. xiv, 767.
THE comprehensiveness of Professor Fraser's volume is evidenced by his an-
nouncement that it is designed "to give students a survey of the history of
conveyancing and of important types of interests in land and chattels, and to
indicate the legal relations constituting each type," and also that the course to
be taught from this and its companion volume (as yet unpublished) is believed
to "suffice on the topics covered for the general practitioner" so that only law
students expecting a specialized practice need elect more advanced property
courses.
While the forty-two English cases are predominantly old cases, only some
nine having been decided since 1850, the American cases, on the contrary, are
good representatives of modern authority, and all are short, well edited and
highly illuminating on their respective topics. In fact it is quite doubtful
whether any other collection of like number and volume contains as concentrated
mental food for the beginning law student. Some superlatives, however, must
be reserved for the non-case parts of the book. While the book was in prepar-
ation the editor confided to this reviewer that it had been necessary to read
countless thousands of pages to find the material here presented on a hundred
printed sheets. This time was well spent and the product presents in concise
form, the best expositions of property -background to be found in the legal
writers of the past.
Thus both cases and readings have been selected with consummate skill and
the book is a most excellent execution of what the editor planned it to be.
It is in the implicit presuppositions of that plan that we must find whatever
is to be criticized in this book. The criterion by which its design should be
judged is simple: Does this material give promise of the best possible utiliza-
tion of the first three semester hours allocated to the beginning course in
property?
The reviewer would hesitate to give an affirmative answer to this last question,
believing that in purporting to lay broad and deep foundations for the com-
prehension of property law, and, simultaneously, to give what Will "suffice on
see note 3.) In one sense I have denied the premise of my own criticism of
these passages; they are all instances of the "defects of his qualities," all
cases where that same drive for wholeness which has produced a book notable
for balance and brilliance, churns froth along the edges. Yet I stand to my
ground. An author of Sigerist's insight can tell froth from fluid. Most of
the froth he spotted long ago for what it was, and did not present to us at all-
Allied but distinct is the treatment of the matter of individual constitution.
The idea puzzles medicine and charms an author of Sigerist's bent. The
uncertainty and groping which comes into his otherwise cleanlined pages when-
ever individual constitution is mentioned is not, however, to be criticized as
avoidable. For the matter was one which had to be dealt with; it does not
lie at Sigerist's door that it is one on which the thought of the medical profession
at large is still unripe. One's only challenge is therefore to the author's over-
verbal dealing with the constitution idea as if it denoted a thing, rather than
an as yet only partially explored area of ignorance-in which it may well
prove that totality of the individual is otw significant factor.
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the topics covered for the general practitioner," the plan of the book calls
for two varied bodies of material which cannot both be presented within the
scope of such a book as this.
In the laying of foundations, the editor has both gone too far and not far
enough for an introductory course in property law. He seeks to carry his
neophytes further than is needful, at this stage, into the abstruse conceptions
and rules of the early common law. He omits from consideration those economic
and social factors of the past centuries which make the feudal system and its
evolution comprehensible. The tale of the change as seen by lawyers is given
with scarcely a suggestion as to the causes which were bringing about these
changes.
The editor encounters further difficulties when he attempts to offer the
student what will "suffice on the topics offered for the general practitioner."
It would seem that all students graduated from state university law schools,
or other law schools of comparable grade, should be prepared to handle general
practices which would include the best business to be had in that community.
The editor admits that "For this purpose more knowledge of non-possessory
interests is required than the introductory course usually affords." Certain it
is that the fourteen pages of Chapter 8 on the rule in Shelley's case and a
related problem, the nineteen pages of Chapter 10 on Powers, and the eleven
pages of Chapter 11 on the "Rule Against Remotely Contingent Interests," can
do nothing more than give that little knowledge which is perhaps more danger-
ous than complete ignorance. This apparent treatment of many topics, thought
of as Future Interests is apt to mislead confiding students into thinking that
they need no further incursions in the difficulties of Future Interests and leaves
less time for those more important subjects in the first course on property.
Professor Fraser has seemingly neglected the present day importance of
statutes in the United States. There is but a hint of the statutory ingredient
of present day law as to estates in fee simple conditional, fee tail and the rule
against remotely contingent interests. Nowhere in the book is the student
made to realize the practitioner's dependence on statutes.
Kirkwood's book, designed for use in schools which have used Fraser's for
a first year course, embodies new collocations of material, new cases on familiar
topics and new methods of presenting material for pedagogical use.
While including many chapters having themes reminiscent of Aigler's Titles,
such as Formal Requisites of Conveyances, Description of the Land Conveyed,
Covenants for Title, Estoppel by Deed and Recording, nearly half of the book
reminds one of Bigelow's Rights in Land. These latter parts deal with Rent,
Profits, Easements, Licenses and Covenants and Agreements Running with the
Land. It seems to this reviewer that this new organization is a partial reach-
ing after a plan of organization liIke that known at Columbia as Vendor and
Purchaser. It is a clear-cut recognition of the importance of bringing together
the mechanics of conveyancing and the consequences of acts purporting to
make conveyances. Perhaps the partial move in this direction will speed the
desirable transition to the more useful organization of material.
In his selection of cases, Professor Kirkwood has managed to obtain an
unusdally fine geographical distribution, and has properly emphasized recently
litigated problems. The new methods of presenting material for pedagogical
use are both interesting and promising. With considerable frequency a case
is followed by a brief statement of the facts of another case with a citation
thereto. Sometimes a question is annexed. This enables the student to consider
the effect of variants in the facts while preparing for class, and is likely to
move upward the level of class discussion. Having used a somewhat similar
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device in the reviewer's case book on Future Interests, he can bear witness to
its utility. Perhaps, in some instances at least, a statement of the courVt
holding may result in a further improvement of class discussion for the average
student, for it is hardly reasonable to expect students to read even five or ten
outside cases in preparation for each class hour. Whether reasonable or not
it won't be done except by the high grade student, who will read the intriguing
decisions cited despite the statement of the results.
In conclusion, then, it seems to this reviewer, that even though Fraser's book
omits vital and needed background, entwines the student too deeply in the
abstruse thinking of medieval lawyers, attempts to cover too large an area of
the law and omits a needed stress on the role of statutes, it is the best published
book for first year classes in property. In spite of all that has been said herein,
the reviewer has chosen the book for the use by his own class in the Spring of
1933. Kirkwood's book seems to be a suitable companion volume especially in
those schools which, on the one hand, do not desire the more ample treatments
in Aigler's Titles and Bigelow's Rights in Land, and, on the other hand, are
hesitant to offer a course on Vendor and Purchaser.
Columbia University School of Law. RICIMw R. PowEmj
CARSON, THE ADVOCATE. By Edward Mlarjoribanks. New York: The
Macmillan Co. 1932. pp. viii, 455. $3.
IF we were called upon to write of Sir Edward Carson as an advocate or man,
the task would be most pleasant. Not so when the assignment is to review
Carson, The Advocate by Marjoribanks. The author is and for a very long
period has been a worshipper of Carson. It appears as if he started to write
a book in which he intended to record the outstanding events of the latter's
life to demonstrate that he was a great advocate. This was well justified and
could readily be done. Indeed, it would have been equally so, had it been
calculated to establish the claim of greatness not only as an advocate but as
statesman-yea, as a man. But as he progressed with his work, the affection
of the author for his subject overcame his judgment. When he began to write
of Carson, it was as a great advocate. He soon convinced himself, however,
Carson was the greatest barrister of his period, next, the ody great barrister
of his time and finally, the greatest barrister of all time. To prove his estimate
correct, he is compared with other members of the bar, in every instance to
the advantage of Carson. The purpose of the book at the conclusion of the
first volume is not merely to make Carson big but many judges and other
barristers small. To those unfamiliar with the characters and abilities of the
men discussed, most unfortunate impressions are brought. Conspicuous ePx-
amples of this unhappy tendency are the following, among many:
In the Alaska boundary case, a dispute between Great Britain and the United
States was submitted to arbitration. The three arbitrators named by the
United States were Elihu Root, Senators Lodge and Turner. Named by the
British Empire were Lord Alverstone, at the time Lord Chief Justice of Eng-
land, Sir Louis Jette, Mr. H. B. Aylesworth, K. C. The arbitrators met to
hear the evidence and pronounce decision in the great hall of the British foreign
office in London. Clearly, neither the venue nor the local press was antagonistic
to the British or Canadian interests. The Lord Chief Justice of England was
selected to preside. The author says: "The United States, Great Britain and
the Dominion (Canada) had all briefed the flower of their respective bars".
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The decision on some of the issues, was in favor of the United States. Of
course, it was to be expected that in the opinion of Mr. Marjoribanks the best
argument was presented by Carson. But it was not to be expected that this.
British writer would be guilty of the indiscretion (to use a very mild term) of
charging that the American arbitrators were biased and decided in favor of the
United States, in utter disregard of the evidence and justice of the respective
claims. But even less should he be forgiven for the denunciation of England's
Lord Chief Justice after but not before the decision, tantamount to making
him a fool and ignoramus, if not worse. The least of the charges he makes is
that the Chief Justice could not, or does he mean would not, comprehend the
issues. The only excuse for these unwarranted assaults upon the integrity
and ability of leaders of thought of their period was the endeavor to make
Carson "perfection" rather than "great"-deified rather than human.
The belittling references to the advocacy of Sir ,Rufus Isaacs, in the Cadbury
and Lever cases are so crudely made, the superlatives applied to that of Carson
are such obvious flattery, that the latter alone suffers very unfairly in con-
sequence. This from the author: "It was anticipated that the action would last
a fortnight, but Carson made up his mind to finish the case in a day or two on
his opening: he felt confident that on the facts before him he could blow the
defendant's case sky high", etc. Who anticipated the case would last a fort-
night? Did Carson tell the author "he had made up his mind to finish the
case in a day or two on his opening"? If not, where did the information come
from? It is known not only to every student of the law but to all laymen who
ever served as jurors that the opening of counsel for the plaintiff is not only
not determinative but in no way indicative of how long the defense will take in
the presentation of testimony. Did Carson tell the author "he felt confident
that on the facts before him he could blow the defendant's case sky high?"
If he did, he was not the learned, able, conservative and modest advocate he
was generally, if not universally, believed to be. If he did not tell this to the
author, then this imaginary contribution might well have been omitted. No
real advocate ever believed that a complaint or defense for which Rufus Isaacs
accepted a brief "could be blown sky high" before the evidence was presented,
by a mere speech of his adversary. The bar of England, as did the Empire,
held Rufus Isaacs in high esteem, else he would not have been made Attorney
General, Lord Chief Justice, Lord Reading's Special Ambassador to the United
States during the World War, Viceroy of India and Viscount. Strange it is
that in none of the references to Isaacs is mention made of the many honors
which his country conferred upon him. For this Carson is in no way to blame,
for he yielded to no man in his respect for Isaacs' ability and integrity.
If these were the only instances of extravagant exaggerations of the abilities
of Carson, when compared with that of his adversaries, they might be over-
looked. Since, however, the book abounds with them, it cannot be treated as
an authentic discussion of Carson's true worth as man or advocate and even
less so of the very many fine and able advocates and men to whom reference
is made therein.
The author again proves, as he did in For the Defense, that he is possessed
of a facile style, capacity for interesting portrayal, useful vocabulary and keen
appreciation of court procedure, as well as telling manner and method of
advocacy. Unless, however, he overcomes his hero worship for the subject of
his biography, his works will never be of real value to his readers. Should
this failing disappear in the second volume, much may be hoped therefor.
New York City. MAX D. STnuEn.
[Vol.42
BOOK REVIEWS
THE MooNEY-BIMNGS REPORT. Suppressed by the Wickersham Commis-
sion. New York: Gotham House, Inc. 1932. pp. iv, 243. $1.50.
THE Mooney-Billings case has become a national scandal. A commission, of
which Felix Frankfurter was secretary, investigated the case years ago and it
was only because of their report in 1918 that Mooney was saved from hanging.
The Wickersham Committee set out to consider the question of 'lawlessness in
law enforcement". This necessarily required an analysis of the Mooney-Billings
case. Apparently the analysis did not suit those in power, for the report was
not even sent to the Senate until the President was called upon to produce it.
A number of senators feeling it was a public document belonging to the people,
asked that it be printed at public expense. This was refused. Finally the
report was published by Gotham House, Inc. at private expense.
A reading of the book presents such an appalling picture of barefaced perjury,
subornation of perjury, crookedness and viciousness on the part of the public
officials of California, that one is not surprised that the Government should
hesitate to publish the report as a public document. The fact that the study
of the case on which the report was based was made by Zeehariah Chaffee, Jr.,
Walter H. Pollak and Carl S. Stern is a warranty of its truth and of the
authenticity of the material. The authors naturally referred to the record
for every statement made. The conclusions were that there was never any
scientific attempt made to discover the perpetrators of the crime; that there
were flagrant violations of California law; that there was no attempt to check
the accuracy of the alleged identifications; that there was a clear effort to
arouse public prejudice against the defendants; that witnesses were produced
at the trial with information in the hands of the prosecution that seriously
challenged their credibility; that witnesses were permitted to testify despite
knowledge in the possession of the prosecution of prior contradictory stories;
that witnesses were coached to a degree that approximated subornation of
perjury; that prejudice stimulated by newspaper publicity was accentuated by
unfair and intemperate arguments to the jury; and that after the trials the
disclosures were ignored and every attempt made to defeat the liberation of the
defendants by a campaign of misrepresentation and propaganda.
One puts down the book with a sense of breathless horror that these victims
are still in jail. Governors have passed on applications for pardon and courts
have again heard the witnesses in a further investigation of the Billings case.
The larger part of the opinions of the court and the Governor has been
devoted to indicating that Mooney and Billings were undesirable citizens.
After the last hearing before James Rolph a letter was sent to his adviser,
Judge Matt L Sullivan, pointing out the fact that less than ten pages out
of eighty-eight in Sullivan's advisory opinion dealt with the evidence in the
Mooney case or the issue of perjury at Mooney's trial. On the other hand,
practically the whole report consisted of condemnation of Mooney's radical
activities. In reply to this letter Judge Sullivan designated the signers of the
letter as "a group made up of parlor bolsheviks, accommodating publicity-
seekers, intellectual irresponsibles and tricky special pleaders . .. " Judge
Sullivan should read the "Mooney-Billings Report-Suppresed by the Wicker-
sham Commission."
It is unfortunate that those with power to act in the matter will ignore this
report as they have every fair presentation of the facts. They have attempted
to discredit Frankfurter's report in 1918 and the report of Judge Densmoro
a few years later.
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Many books on subjects as inflammable as this are written by radicals or
those who have a point to prove. The value of this particular report-that
it was made by quasi-public officials-is further enhanced by the fact that it
is a public document which the Government attempted to suppress,
New York City. ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS.
THE LAKE CARGO COAL RATE CONTROVERSY. A Study in Governmental
Adjustment of a Sectional Dispute. By Harvey C. Mansfield. New
York: Columbia University Press. 1932. pp. 273. $4.25.
OF late we have had primers for planners. Here is a work which might well
be assigned as advanced, and less palatable, reading. Dr. Mansfield's "safe
prediction" at the close of this "study in governmental adjustmentof a sectional
dispute" is that the chief disputants will be "fighting over lake cargo rate
differentials for generations to come." Among the obstacles to a more lasting
adjustment of this conflict are problems which must ultimately be faced by
those desirous of extending the social control of our national economy. They
give to this work an importance which transcends that of its immediate subject.
The controversy whose termination seems so remote began in 1909 when
coal operators in the Pittsburgh field sought to curb increasing participation
by West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee operators in the profitable slack
season shipment of coal by rail to the Great Lakes and thence by water to
the northwest. The lower-cost southern operators had been able to absorb the
12 cent differential in rates between the northern and the more distant southern
fields, a differential which, because of the "missionary" activities of the southern
carriers, was in no measure proportionate to the greater length of the haul.
For the northern operators, the obvious method of reducing southern competition
was to procure an increase in this differential. Their efforts to do so pre-
cipitated proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission, as has
virtually every change in the lake cargo rate structure since. In a period of
little more than twenty years, there have been eleven lake cargo rate cases
decided by the Commission, the last of which was dismissed in January, 1932.
During this time the lake cargo trade has greatly increased, as has its im-
portance to the overdeveloped, undernourished bituminous coal indusiry. The
rate differential has been increased, but the northern field's share of the trade
has diminished. The present differential of 35 cents represents a compromise
reached by the carriers which satisfies neither operator group but which with-
stood northern attack in the 1931 proceedings.
Dr. Mansfield sketches for the reader the fortunes of the bituminous coal
industry as a background before which he passes in careful review all the
successive phases of this protracted and increasingly acrimonious litigation.
Then comes what for the general reader will prove the most interesting portion of
the book, a scrutiny of the personnel of the Commission, particularly the quali-
fications of the more recent appointees and the motives behind their appointment.
The lake cargo controversy lends point to this inquiry. In 1928, senatorial
partisans of the embattled southern operators succeeded in blocling the re-
appointment of Comnissioner Esch who had shifted his vote from the southern
to the northern side between 1925 and 1927. His rejection was the climax to
a period of suspicion in which each nomination led to charges of attempts "to
pack" the Commission. Senators whose constituencies were disgruntled by
other Commission rulings joined in the assault. Bills were introduced to limit
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tenure to a single term and to apportion membership geographically. Both
failed of passage.
The remainder of the volume is devoted to a consideration of the "questions
of law" discerned in this litigation. It is somewhat surprising that only one
of the Commission's eleven orders therein has been subjected to judicial review.1
The course of the proceedings has, however, been definitely influenced by the
Commission's shifting, and not always clearly defined, views regarding two
possible limitations upon its powers. To each of these, Dr. Mansfield devotes
a chapter.
Throughout the lake cargo litigation, the operators, always the real parties
in interest, have been concerned not with the "reasonableness" of either of the
rates but with their relationship. Yet since this relationship has been main-
tained by rates fixed, at least until recently, by independent lines, it has generally
been thought not to present a case of "discrimination" within Section 3 of the
Interstate Commerce Act. Section 1, enjoining "just and reasonable" rates
has been the chief recourse of counsel, and the resulting disparity between the
legal issue and the economic one has imparted a degree of disingenuousness to
the hearings before the Commission. Yet it has been feared that the concession
to the Commission of the power to correct discrimination against localities
where the defendant carriers have not participated in both the rates whose
relationship is assailed, would tend inevitably to the treatment of the carriers
"as parts of a single great system".
Such a construction of the Commission's power would intensify the importance
of the second problem, the propriety of its consideration of commercial, as
distinguished from transportation, conditions in rate regulation. Inasmuch
as their isolation would necessitate an all but impossible psychological feat,
this problem resolves itself into a question of how consciously the former factors
may be examined and weighed without provoking judicial censure. The author
sees the two problems as together posing the question of the Commission's
function in our political and economic system. His thorough examination of
the cases discloses a tendency on the part of the Commission to compromise
between the alternative roles of guide to "the orderly development of commerce
and industry" and of adjuster of rate disputes without regard for their com-
mercial consequences 2
On this broader issue, Dr. Mansfield offers no opinion. He seems to await with
the fatalism characteristic of the American student of public affairs, its
determination by the Supreme Court.3 Yet here, if ever, have we an issue of
1. In Anchor Coal Co. v.,United States, 25 F. (2d) 462 (S. D. W. Va. 1928)
a statutory court restrained the enforcement of the Commission's 1927 order
increasing the rate differential. While an appeal was pending, the carriers
agreed upon the compromise differential referred to above. The Supreme Court
thereupon held the question moot. United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U. S.
812 (1929).
2. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Commission in its
recent Annual Report complains that its most ambitious attempt to overhaul
systematically the rate structure of the country, Docket 17000, has "developed
into unwieldy proportions" and suggests that "large proceedings like theze
should be initiated in the future only sparingly." See 93 RAILWAY AGE 946
(Dec. 24, 1932).
3. A case now pending before the Supreme Court, Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.
v. United States, reargued October 11, 12, 13, 1932, may lead to a decision on
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policy calling for legislative action. Defter draftsmanship than that displayed
in the ill-considered Hoch-Smith Resolution, which represents the chief Con-
gressional contribution to this problem, might avoid exciting the constitutional
sensibilities of certain Justices. It is the want of closer articulation between
the legislative and executive branches of our government which casts into the
hands of the Supreme Court, and, all too frequently, into the arcana of
Constitutional Law, the determination of those broad problems of policy, not
anticipated by statute, for which the technical competence of the administrator
affords no guaranty of a wise solution. Perhaps it is here that the "National
Economic Councils" of the planners might be of most immediate utility.
Dr. Mansfield's report of the lake cargo rate controversy is concise yet
adequate, lucid, and objective--perhaps a bit too objective for the reader to
appreciate fully the atmosphere of antagonism engendered by this litigation.
The work has the utility and limitations of a case study. Only through such
an account as this is the proper comprehension of any one step in the con-
troversy possible, a consideration which must leave much of our legal teaching
and writing suspect of superficiality. But at this juncture comes the realiza-
tion that this entire controversy is itself but an interlocutory proceeding in
"the case of bituminous coal", which in turn, is ancillary to the threatened
receivership for unregulated private enterprise. Decidedly, we have need for
more than primers.
Duke University Law School. DAVID F. CAVERS.
the scope of the Commission's power to correct discrimination. The decision
below is reported in 42 F. (2d) 281 (S. D. Tex. 1930).
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